In
order to make sure history doesn't repeat itself, Bolivia should
compare the Movement Towards Socialism's (MAS) popular 2005 Electoral
Revolution, and subsequent 2006 Agrarian Reform, to Bolivia's earlier
popular 1952 Revolution, and subsequent 1953 Agrarian Reform. Three
major issues that Bolivia had to face, which led to the 1953 Agrarian
Reform failing, were: 1) Bolivia's long history of violence; 2)
interference from the United States, and; 3) a corrupt leader, who
eventually betrayed the 1952 Revolution. The problems of the failed
1953 Agrarian Reform are instructive for President Evo Morales Ayma
to avoid today, if he wants a successful legacy.
The
1% in Bolivia, in 2006,
owned 2/3 of the country's farm land...
Immediately
after the 1952 Revolution was victorious,
“over
300,000 peasant families forcefully seized lands”...“and have
worked them while waiting for legal process to sanction or question a
de facto situation.”…“In the high fertile valleys (around
Cochabamba, Sucre, Tarija), smoldering resentment against oppressive
landlords broke into open warfare when the Indians got arms... (from
the victorious Revolution), before the land reform was drafted. It is
a well documented fact that many farmers who refused to yield their
properties to insurgent bands of Quechua peasants... were driven off
by force, or shot. There were many landowners who simply abandoned
their farms, leaving herds of select livestock, all types of dairying
and farming machinery, and their household and personal effects
rather than risk staying where anarchy ravaged the land.”6
Nearly
immediately after the land reform decree of August 2, 1953 was
announced, there was virtually no peasant without land of their own,
due to the expulsion of the ex-landowners.7 Because
of Bolivia's legacy of Machismo violence, Bolivians know that they
must be prepared to defend themselves, for self-preservation. This is
why President Paz (MNR) armed the miners and the trade union
militias, and more, in order to fight off the old state guard, who
were armed, and loyal to the land-owning 1% elite. The miners could
trust themselves, but not the army or the police. The COB (Bolivian
Worker's Center) was a major trade union in Bolivia. In 1952, during
the first months of Bolivia's Revolution, the COB, under Juan
Lechin's leadership, already had an armed force made up of workers
and peasants when President Paz's MNR party had no forces of their
own. So arming the COB with Bolivia's money was a win-win situation
for MNR and COB. By putting the guns into the rebel's hands, who
already had turned their factories into “fortresses of the
revolution”8,
and forming new peasant organizations, called Syndicates, the COB
held the real power in Bolivia. In 1955, Juan Lechin bragged to a
Chilean: “Fifty-five thousand guns are in the hands of the people.
The peasants form fifteen regiments; the miners have ten thousand
men; the rail workers two thousand; the factory workers three
thousand” (15,
pp. 170-171). Landlords, faced with such strength, could usually do
nothing but comply with the new law.9
Because
of the lessons of the 1950s, Bolivians understand that in order to
succeed, sometimes you must take the initial first step. When the
workers and miners were armed, and Paz had no military, he gave them
weapons. When landless Bolivians had no land, and they took it, and
the government passed a law saying that whatever soil you were
tilling, that was the land you owned. Without being armed, there's
little chance that the landless would have had at keeping the land
they “stole”. It's not surprising that there have been “an
increase in peasant occupations of private land” during the Morales
Administration”10,
though he's not against using the militia to violently put down
protests, and social unrest, several times in Bolivia. The military
crackdown over the protests over an unpopular proposed new road
several years ago caused two high ranking officials—Defense
Minister Cecilia Chacon and Immigration Director Maria Rene
Quiroga—to resign in outrage. Quiroga said that the crackdown was
“unforgivable”. Today, 20 Bolivian civilian protesters are still
missing.11
On March 19, 2012, Evo Morales deployed 2,300 soldiers to patrol the
streets, since the police weren't sufficient to handling the outbreak
of criminal activity.12
Typically, for good or ill, the government of Nation-States claim
monopoly on all a country's violence, and for peasants to challenge a
heavily armed opponent, such as the State, that's a situation that
could easily become a bloodbath. But government's aren't always
against the people. Teddy Roosevelt threatened to use America's
troops to work in the Mines during the US Coal Mining Strike of 1902,
when the US first became arbitrator between a labor dispute. So Evo's
use of violence should be looked at carefully, to make sure his
sentiments and loyalties haven't deflected away from the miners and
the peasants, and to the capitalists.
There
is a historical parallel when it comes to land inequality between the
1950s, and the 2000s, in Bolivia. Before the 1953 Land Reform, 8% of
Bolivian estates
were over 500 hectares (latifundios), which occupied 95% of privately
held farmland, and they are controlled “by a small aristocracy made
up of 4 per cent of all landowners”13
1/10 of the area was held by 8 landholders. At the other extreme, 61%
of land-holdings, all below 5 hectares (minifundios), covered 0.3% of
the total area and 8% of the cultivated lands. The
“latifundios” and “minifundios” covered about 80 per cent of
all land recorded by the 1950 census.”14
There
wasn't much confidence in the progress of the 1953 Land Reform
decree, when in 1958, President Siles Zuazo, in a State of the Union
address to the legislature, estimated that it would take 30 to 40
years before the Land Reform would be completed. However, “Beltran
and Fernandez (1960) have calculated that if the “rhythm” of the
first period of the reform (1953 to 1956) were followed, it would
take 485 years to distribute the land. If the increased pace of the
1956-1959 period were to continue, it would take 108 years.”15
Ten
years after the 1953 Land Reform Act was passed, “no more than
one-tenth of the agricultural labor force” benefited, and only
1/10, or 13%, of the land registered from the 1950 Census was
distributed by 1963.16
In 1970, the conditions in Cochabamba Valley, the center of the
Bolivian Revolution, where the latifundio-minifundio system “subsists
under the guise of natural pastures or as a so-called agricultural
enterprise. And as an inevitable result of these profound distortions
in the policy of land distribution, the precarious forms of land
tenure, sharecropping, and marginal wages have been maintained.”17
Now
it's 2012, and that's given the 1953 Land Reform 59 years to make
whatever progress it was going to make. The 1953 Land Reform failed
since there still exists economic and land inequality in Bolivia
today. In a 2010 report, we see that “approximately 100 families
own 12.5 million acres of land, compared against the 2 million
Bolivians who crowd onto 2.5 million acres. Economic and social
change in Bolivia will likely come at the expense of the one-fifth
of one percent of the population who own the largest estates.”18
While Bolivia's poverty still coexists with a small concentration of
wealth (1/5 of 1%!), what's more perplexing is that Bolivia has an
abundance of natural resources in Bolivia's dirt. This makes Bolivia
a “beggar on a throne of gold”19.
President Evo Morales Ayma alludes to the land reform failure, when
he points out the overall failure of 1952 Revolution to improve many
Bolivians' lives, since Evo Morales came to the throne of gold by
boasting of a “refounding” of the lost principles of the 1952
Revolution20.
On
May 2, 2006, Evo Morales showed progress for helping the majority
poor and landless when he handed out “3 million hectares of lands
among 60 native Bolivian groups and communities, with a promise of
awarding another 20 million extra hectares of lands within the coming
5 years”. This amounts to 13% of the total land areas in Bolivia
being distributed among 28% of the Bolivian peasants.21
So while progress is being made, towards a larger radical change in
land redistribution, can President Evo Morales Ayma be trusted? The
Bolivian landlords were also assured by the government that the lands
they obtained legally and
used for cultivation would remain unaffected. Moreover, under
Morales' land reform program, there would be no provisions for
annexation of the landowners' lands or scopes for negotiating any
such settlements.22
Also, Evo Morales will have to watch his back, and make sure the CIA
doesn't assassinate him, since Morales is a simple man of humble
origins, like Chile's Salvador Allende, who was also an elected
Socialist, and was assassinated by the CIA in 1973.
If
we are to learn from the past, then Evo Morales Ayma should not be
trusted, because of example of Victor Paz Estenssoro. President Paz,
with his National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) Party, was the man who
ushered in the 1953 Agrarian Reform, after his political party seized
power in a bloody Revolution on April 9-11, 1952. While President Paz
was in exile in Argentina, he won the election, and had to fight the
junta who had taken over.23
One
year after being in power, 1953, Paz implements the Land Reform
Decree as a means to pacify the revolting masses, and as a means to
consolidate the Revolution. In some areas, the Indians had took the
land of their former landlord by force, and, according to Victor Paz
Estenssoro, “the land reform decree had a clause which
stated that from the very first day of the reform, the peasants
became owners of sayanas, the plots of land which they had
been cultivating.”...“With this, the agitation in the countryside
subsided completely.”24
While Paz tried to make sure the former landowners were given some of
their land back, or compensated for their property, Paz explains,
“The majority of the owners of
those fincas which had been taken over by the peasants did not return
to them until the process of redistribution had been completed,
because the cases affected [by invasion]…were those in which the
peasants had been subjected to tremendous abuses from the landlords.
Therefore, the owners themselves were fearful of reprisals from
[those]…liberated by the land reform.”25
While
Bolivia has a long history of violence, the 1952 Revolution wasn't as
bloody as say Mexico's Revolution, which saw 1 million perish, or
America's, which saw 25,000 die, or Lenin and Trotsky's October
Russian Revolution, which saw 6 die. Bolivia's
1952 Revolution was a Proletarian Revolution, where the workers and
the peasants, igniting in the Cochabamba valley, where the campesinos
drove landowners off their own estates, and ending, as in
Mexico, with the government arming the peasants the better to defend
their gains.26
3,000 Bolivians died in the 1952 Revolution. The land reform in the
Mexican Revolution, from 1910 to 1917, was used to ignite their
Revolution, whereas Bolivia's 1953 land reform was used to pacify,
and “consolidate” their Revolution.
It
wasn't until President Paz's 2nd and 3rd term
when he put his counter Revolution, from above, into action, but
there were several foreshadowing clues about Paz's eventual
deflection of Bolivia's Revolution, such as the immediate
correspondence, and cozy meetings with the United States capitalists
in back door rooms in the early aftermath of the Revolution. The
United States seems to wander into it's Latin American “backyard”
whenever it feels like it, and it was true in 1954 during the
Eisenhower Administration. The US wanted to make sure that the
Bolivian Revolution wouldn't affect their “national interests”. A
Pennsylvania newspaper reports in 1954 that “the Eisenhower
administration, a conservative regime, has thrown its full weight
behind this liberal, left-of-center regime”.27
The United States had sent an ambassador to Bolivia, and were
supportive of President Paz. When Paz was asked what he thought about
Communism, Paz responded with “I have found that the best way to
combat Communism is to give him some land. A man who owns land
doesn't become a Communist.”
President
Paz was only allowed to be President for one term, according to the
new Constitution, and he stepped down in 1956, only to be reelected
President in 1960. This turned out to be a fatal mistake for Bolivia,
since President Zuazo had been implementing land reform faster than
President Paz had when he was in power. President Paz's
second term beginning in 1960 was mired with violence, when he had to
pacify the peasants he had armed just 8 years prior. The blood of the
very same leftists would stain President Paz's legacy he had captured
in the 1952 Revolution. This is the beginning of President's Paz's
counter Revolution. In October 1964, 10 miners were killed in Oruro,
and Paz blamed the Communists and leftists.28
In 1964, turncoat Paz picked Rene Barrientos Ortuno, a right-wing
military general (who gleefully kills Che Guevara in 1967), to be his
running mate. With the United States CIA's assistance, Lt. General
Rene Barrientos overthrows President Paz, and once again, sends
Victor Paz Estenssoro into exile.
An American newspaper reported on May 18, 1965 that the “junta last night decided to dismiss all of the nation's principal union leaders and call union elections within 40 days to choose replacements.”…“A mob of about 6000 persons protesting the deportation of one-time Vice President Juan Lechin stormed through the city yesterday, stoning and burning government buildings and overturning autos.”... “Lt. Gen. Rene Barrientos, the junta chief, said in a broadcast that the “demagoguery” of Lechin and ousted ex-President Victor Paz Estenssoro was to blame for the disorders and he promised “energetic and rapid measures... to wipe out agitators and prevent chaos.” ... “The ruling military junta, meanwhile, pressed its drive for a military occupation of the government-run tin mines.”… “Gen. Alfredo Ovando, head of the armed forces, said there will be no truce until they freed the 70 hostages detained by the miners in various mines.”29
Fast
forward 20 years, and we see Victor Paz Estenssoro reemerge in
1985, where he is once again elected President of Bolivia (the
Constitution only barred “consecutive” terms). 1985 gives Victor
Paz Estenssoro his final shot to move Bolivia forward. In 1985, in
order to combat inflation, President Paz hires Harvard
economist Jeffrey Sachs to implement the New Economic Policy (NEP),
or what Naomi Klein calls “shock therapy.” Shock Therapy calls
for immediate price increases, severe cuts in government spending and
privatization of publicly owned assets, all at once.30
Shock Therapy was used in Chile, after the United States murdered
their Socialist President in 1973, and then forced Capitalism on them
by the decree of the military junta. Kissinger said that the US was
going to make Chile's “economy scream”. Victor Paz was planning
on making Bolivia's economy scream. The NEP had the country's
national currency, the boliviano,
devalued, “export/import controls were removed, price controls and
government subsidies on consumer goods were removed, while wages and
salaries were frozen. To reduce government spending, educational
outlays were slashed, the program of colonizing the lowlands was
stopped, and efforts at industrial diversification were halted.
Practically all social welfare allocations were terminated.”31
The new MNR betrayed Bolivia's 1952 Revolution because
the 1985 New Economic Policy “shifted the ideology that government
should be directly responsible for the basic sectors of the economy
to an ideology of economic liberalism”32
Paz's New Economic Policy “dramatically changed the course of the
previous three decades of nationalism, state intervention, and social
rights.”33
Paz “did not emancipate [Bolivia] from foreign domination, lift it
from its position as the second poorest in the hemisphere, resolve
the question of land tenure, create integrated economic development,
or ensure effective democratic rights for the indigenous masses.”34
In 1985, Victor Paz Estenssoro, going from President George to King
George III, going from liberator to oppressor, betrayed his own
Revolution.
Once
the NEP Presidential Decree was issued, miners and labor unions
declared a General Strike. Paz doubled the ante and issued a State of
Siege, using the military to crack down on the peasants opposed to
the Neoliberalism shock therapy, many of whom Paz had armed after the
1952 Revolution. However, Naomi Klein points out, Paz's response
“made Thatcher's treatment of the miners seem tame”.35
Paz declared a State of Siege (Martial Law), and rounded up the top
200 union leaders, loaded them onto planes and flew them to remote
jails in the rainforests.
The
1985 New Economic Policy counter Revolution was a major
victory for the United States, and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF). Instead of having to use brute force, and sustaining free
markets for big business's with blood, the United States instead
chose to use their large war chest, with loans and aid, in order to
keep Paz pacified, and on a short leash36.
The United States forced Bolivia to use its scarce capital to
compensate former mine owners and repay their foreign debts, instead
of domestic development and infrastructure.37
“By
January, the British embassy could report to the Foreign Office that
Paz Estenssoro was “getting a lot of help and advice from the
Americans and knew when to bend his knee” (British Foreign Office
Archives #AX1051/1)”38.
The United States have their national interests, and Bolivia has
theirs. When the two nations have policies that contradict each other
(such as America's exported War on Drugs), Bolivia's self-interests
should take precedent, and where each nation's self-interests
intersect, that creates room for common ground, and cooperation, for
trade, security, etc., between the two nations.
The
United States used it's Pacification of Bolivia as a model for future
countries. The
National Security Council saw the successful handling of the Bolivian
situation as a model (OCB Central File 091.4 Latin America [File #3]
[3], February 3, 1955, 8), and it was one that would be exploited to
the fullest in Latin America and elsewhere.” The
US influenced Paz with “large-scale
financial support”, and “its influence over the Bolivian
government was greater than it had been prior to the revolution,
since the old ruling class—tied to the tin barons—had been in
conflict with the United States over the price of tin (Whitehead,
1969)”. 39
The
IMF was so impressed with Bolivia's results, they were “held up as
a model for Less Developed Countries around the World”.40
Unfortunately
the praise from the IMF couldn't make up for the 1985 NEP Shock
Therapy's failure.
Unemployment
took its heaviest toll on Bolivia's fragile industrial sector.
Without state backing, factory closures led to 35,000 people losing
their jobs. Those that remained in employment did not fare much
better, with real wages dropping by 40 per cent. Not only did
neoliberalism fail to create jobs, but the dismantling of the central
bureaucracy undermined the government's ability to respond to the
damaging effects of joblessness. Many who lost jobs migrated to the
east of the country to grow coca, which by the 1980s was Bolivia's
most profitable export.41
The
US pushed for the embrace of neoliberal policies, and when those
policies didn't take hold, social unrest began to foment in Bolivia.
In 2000, we see the Water Wars, and in 2003, the Gas Wars, and then
the eventually Electoral “Refounding” Revolution of Evo Morales
in 2005. Because of the constant meddling the US has shown towards
Bolivia, tension has existed between the two nations. In September
2008, Evo Morales Ayma barred the US Ambassador from Boliva, and the
US reciprocated the move. Now Evo Morales Ayma, taking a lesson from
his fallen Revolutionary predecessor, is not backing down. He has
been calling for a removal of the Embassy from Bolivian soil if they
don't stop spreading unrest. Evo
Morales also said this: “The Americans used the drug trade to
infiltrate our countries. They brought cocaine to Bolivia, as here we
only used to chew the coca from the times of the Incas. We believe in
a democratic revolution, an indigenous revolution, to claim back our
land and all of our natural resources.”42
In
1934, Trotsky, who is popular in Bolivia, wrote that the power of the
United States was used to “disunite, weaken and enslave Latin
America”. Trotsky believed that the proletariat leader who would
free the oppressed all around the world was going to come out of
Latin America.43
Fundamental to Marx's idea
of revolution was that meaningful change can come only from the
masses from below. Freedom will come to the oppressed Bolivians when
they grab freedom for themselves, like the indigenous campesino
ancestors did in the 1950s, and by learning how to institutionalizing
self-government.
The
1952 Revolution started out by being a genuine Proletarian
Revolution, where the workers and miners took La Paz, the Capital of
Bolivia, over. Eventually the Revolution was co-opted, and then later
extinguished by the ruling bourgeois political party. For a
Proletarian Revolution to be effective, power
must stay in the hands of the lower classes: the workers and the
peasants. The US was able to co-opt Bolivia's Revolution, and
completely turn it around, by greasing the politician's palms with
greenbacks.44
Evo Morales was responsive to the Bolivian People when he decided to
pull the plug on the proposed road going through the TIPNIS
territory (Isiboro Secure National Park and Indigenous Territory).
That's a hopeful sign that Evo Morales will not go the way of Victor
Paz. Evo Morales has also been taking strong stands against the US
government, kicking out the US ambassador in 2008, and recently,
March 2012, he's now threatening to kick out the entire embassy. This
is exactly what Evo Morales needs to do. Morales has a great trading
partner with China, and so his economy will be okay. Evo Morales Ayma
is correct in making the United States earn their trust because of
the historical relationship the US had with Bolivia specifically, and
with Latin America in general, as has been heavily documented in
Eduardo Galeano's 1971 Open
Veins in Latin America.,
the book that Hugo Chavez handed to Barack Obama a few years ago.
The
lessons of 1952 Bolivia by the dual-power sharing deal that was
agreed on when the April Revolution was over, between Paz's MNR, and
Lechin's trade union, the COB (Bolivian Worker's Central) have much
to teach. Eventually, the MNR was able to pacify the COB with
political appointments45,
and took the reins of the power of the Revolution into their own
hands, and away from the miners, and led Bolivia straight into a tar
pit of financial ruin. The Revolution would have been better
preserved had the COB been able to maintain their influence in
government affairs with institutions, or they could have crowned
themselves, and that would have maintained the integrity of the
“people's revolution”, a genuine, of, by, and for the people-type
of revolution.
While
there is a historical parallel between Bolivia of the 1950s, and
Bolivia of the 2000s and 2010s, it's also important to understand
that every historical setting is different, and so history is limited
to what it can teach. This is especially true in Evo Morales Ayma's
case, where there's only a few elected Socialist Heads of State in
the World, and so therefore Morales doesn't have much historical
guidance for what is to come in Bolivia's future. Revolution and Land
Reform are also complicated subjects. A good place to start one's
research of the issues of the 1953 Agrarian Reform is a list of 13
problems located at the end of Rodolfo Stavenhagen's Agrarian
Problems and Peasant Movements in Latin America (1970),
pages 344-346, which goes into greater detail into the issues that
Evo Morales may encounter. One creative suggestion that's offered is
to have a 2 man mobile team, made up of a land judge and a
topographer, who goes around Bolivia, resolving land disputes between
conflicting parties.
Thomas
Hobbes teaches us that in the State of Nature that life for humans
are “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short”. All humans are
corruptible, and so if there's no accountability, such as elections,
or oversight, such as the COB, and other popular citizen groups, who
pressure the government to hear the people's demands, then expect
that leader to become corrupt. Don't worship any humans. Victor Paz
co-opted Bolivia's Proletarian Revolution. All people are fallible,
including the great Evo Morales Ayma. Latin Americans need to be more
critical of their iron-fisted dictators, since they seem to like
their “caudillos”, such as Hugo Chavez, Juan Peron, others, and
fall for their cult of personalities. The allure of the abuse of
power is where corruption comes from, and one has to have a strong
moral core, a code, a set of principles from which to live by before
going into politics. Having a personal code beforehand won't
guarantee that the corruptible person will be an untouchable, but
without one, there's absolutely no hope for that individual, and
therefore, for the common people.
No
matter who Morales has advising him, ultimately, history will judge
Morales the individual on how well his Administration laid the
foundational infrastructure of his Socialist government for
generations to come. The three big issues that Evo Morales needs to
understand, if he wants his Land Reform to be successful, and for it
to last, is: 1) to be mindful of Bolivia's violent history, such as
internal coup detats; 2) be skeptical of US interference, such as
external coup detats, and; 3) continue to maintain his revolutionary
purity by being a fiercely loyal and responsive servant of the
Bolivian masses.
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1Grove
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24Wilkie,
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34Sander,
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38Zunes,
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44Patch,
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45Justo,
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