Wednesday, April 18, 2012

Bolivia's Dirt

In order to make sure history doesn't repeat itself, Bolivia should compare the Movement Towards Socialism's (MAS) popular 2005 Electoral Revolution, and subsequent 2006 Agrarian Reform, to Bolivia's earlier popular 1952 Revolution, and subsequent 1953 Agrarian Reform. Three major issues that Bolivia had to face, which led to the 1953 Agrarian Reform failing, were: 1) Bolivia's long history of violence; 2) interference from the United States, and; 3) a corrupt leader, who eventually betrayed the 1952 Revolution. The problems of the failed 1953 Agrarian Reform are instructive for President Evo Morales Ayma to avoid today, if he wants a successful legacy.

The 1% in Bolivia, in 2006, owned 2/3 of the country's farm land...
...and it was because of these unequal conditions, and more, that brought about the social upheavals. While the 2006 Land Reform Law will only affect “government land, unused tracts of private land, and land that was illegally acquired”, the landed elites, mostly white, “have began to orchestrate violent attacks against the indigenous people in alliance with crypto-fascist paramilitary youth mobs”.1 Violence is embedded in Bolivian culture. As of October 6, 1954, Bolivia has had “129 revolutions in 129 years”, and Paz, having served a little over two years after the 1952 Revolution, was the longest living President of Bolivia to date2. Freedom House points out, that, “the armed forces were responsible for more than 180 coups in 157 years”, up until 1982.3 2001 was the turning point with regard to the use of force by landowners. As the landowners began to lose in court, they resorted to “private armies”.4 Since 2001, Bolivia has had six Presidents, and there have been 150 lynchings or attempted lynchings in Bolivia since 20095. So the legacy of Machismo violence tenaciously persists today in Bolivia, as does all across Latin America.

Immediately after the 1952 Revolution was victorious,

over 300,000 peasant families forcefully seized lands”...“and have worked them while waiting for legal process to sanction or question a de facto situation.”…“In the high fertile valleys (around Cochabamba, Sucre, Tarija), smoldering resentment against oppressive landlords broke into open warfare when the Indians got arms... (from the victorious Revolution), before the land reform was drafted. It is a well documented fact that many farmers who refused to yield their properties to insurgent bands of Quechua peasants... were driven off by force, or shot. There were many landowners who simply abandoned their farms, leaving herds of select livestock, all types of dairying and farming machinery, and their household and personal effects rather than risk staying where anarchy ravaged the land.”6

Nearly immediately after the land reform decree of August 2, 1953 was announced, there was virtually no peasant without land of their own, due to the expulsion of the ex-landowners.7 Because of Bolivia's legacy of Machismo violence, Bolivians know that they must be prepared to defend themselves, for self-preservation. This is why President Paz (MNR) armed the miners and the trade union militias, and more, in order to fight off the old state guard, who were armed, and loyal to the land-owning 1% elite. The miners could trust themselves, but not the army or the police. The COB (Bolivian Worker's Center) was a major trade union in Bolivia. In 1952, during the first months of Bolivia's Revolution, the COB, under Juan Lechin's leadership, already had an armed force made up of workers and peasants when President Paz's MNR party had no forces of their own. So arming the COB with Bolivia's money was a win-win situation for MNR and COB. By putting the guns into the rebel's hands, who already had turned their factories into “fortresses of the revolution”8, and forming new peasant organizations, called Syndicates, the COB held the real power in Bolivia. In 1955, Juan Lechin bragged to a Chilean: “Fifty-five thousand guns are in the hands of the people. The peasants form fifteen regiments; the miners have ten thousand men; the rail workers two thousand; the factory workers three thousand” (15, pp. 170-171). Landlords, faced with such strength, could usually do nothing but comply with the new law.9

Because of the lessons of the 1950s, Bolivians understand that in order to succeed, sometimes you must take the initial first step. When the workers and miners were armed, and Paz had no military, he gave them weapons. When landless Bolivians had no land, and they took it, and the government passed a law saying that whatever soil you were tilling, that was the land you owned. Without being armed, there's little chance that the landless would have had at keeping the land they “stole”. It's not surprising that there have been “an increase in peasant occupations of private land” during the Morales Administration”10, though he's not against using the militia to violently put down protests, and social unrest, several times in Bolivia. The military crackdown over the protests over an unpopular proposed new road several years ago caused two high ranking officials—Defense Minister Cecilia Chacon and Immigration Director Maria Rene Quiroga—to resign in outrage. Quiroga said that the crackdown was “unforgivable”. Today, 20 Bolivian civilian protesters are still missing.11 On March 19, 2012, Evo Morales deployed 2,300 soldiers to patrol the streets, since the police weren't sufficient to handling the outbreak of criminal activity.12 Typically, for good or ill, the government of Nation-States claim monopoly on all a country's violence, and for peasants to challenge a heavily armed opponent, such as the State, that's a situation that could easily become a bloodbath. But government's aren't always against the people. Teddy Roosevelt threatened to use America's troops to work in the Mines during the US Coal Mining Strike of 1902, when the US first became arbitrator between a labor dispute. So Evo's use of violence should be looked at carefully, to make sure his sentiments and loyalties haven't deflected away from the miners and the peasants, and to the capitalists.

There is a historical parallel when it comes to land inequality between the 1950s, and the 2000s, in Bolivia. Before the 1953 Land Reform, 8% of Bolivian estates were over 500 hectares (latifundios), which occupied 95% of privately held farmland, and they are controlled “by a small aristocracy made up of 4 per cent of all landowners”13 1/10 of the area was held by 8 landholders. At the other extreme, 61% of land-holdings, all below 5 hectares (minifundios), covered 0.3% of the total area and 8% of the cultivated lands. The “latifundios” and “minifundios” covered about 80 per cent of all land recorded by the 1950 census.”14 There wasn't much confidence in the progress of the 1953 Land Reform decree, when in 1958, President Siles Zuazo, in a State of the Union address to the legislature, estimated that it would take 30 to 40 years before the Land Reform would be completed. However, “Beltran and Fernandez (1960) have calculated that if the “rhythm” of the first period of the reform (1953 to 1956) were followed, it would take 485 years to distribute the land. If the increased pace of the 1956-1959 period were to continue, it would take 108 years.”15

Ten years after the 1953 Land Reform Act was passed, “no more than one-tenth of the agricultural labor force” benefited, and only 1/10, or 13%, of the land registered from the 1950 Census was distributed by 1963.16 In 1970, the conditions in Cochabamba Valley, the center of the Bolivian Revolution, where the latifundio-minifundio system “subsists under the guise of natural pastures or as a so-called agricultural enterprise. And as an inevitable result of these profound distortions in the policy of land distribution, the precarious forms of land tenure, sharecropping, and marginal wages have been maintained.”17

Now it's 2012, and that's given the 1953 Land Reform 59 years to make whatever progress it was going to make. The 1953 Land Reform failed since there still exists economic and land inequality in Bolivia today. In a 2010 report, we see that “approximately 100 families own 12.5 million acres of land, compared against the 2 million Bolivians who crowd onto 2.5 million acres. Economic and social change in Bolivia will likely come at the expense of the one-fifth of one percent of the population who own the largest estates.”18 While Bolivia's poverty still coexists with a small concentration of wealth (1/5 of 1%!), what's more perplexing is that Bolivia has an abundance of natural resources in Bolivia's dirt. This makes Bolivia a “beggar on a throne of gold”19. President Evo Morales Ayma alludes to the land reform failure, when he points out the overall failure of 1952 Revolution to improve many Bolivians' lives, since Evo Morales came to the throne of gold by boasting of a “refounding” of the lost principles of the 1952 Revolution20.

On May 2, 2006, Evo Morales showed progress for helping the majority poor and landless when he handed out “3 million hectares of lands among 60 native Bolivian groups and communities, with a promise of awarding another 20 million extra hectares of lands within the coming 5 years”. This amounts to 13% of the total land areas in Bolivia being distributed among 28% of the Bolivian peasants.21 So while progress is being made, towards a larger radical change in land redistribution, can President Evo Morales Ayma be trusted? The Bolivian landlords were also assured by the government that the lands they obtained legally and used for cultivation would remain unaffected. Moreover, under Morales' land reform program, there would be no provisions for annexation of the landowners' lands or scopes for negotiating any such settlements.22 Also, Evo Morales will have to watch his back, and make sure the CIA doesn't assassinate him, since Morales is a simple man of humble origins, like Chile's Salvador Allende, who was also an elected Socialist, and was assassinated by the CIA in 1973.

If we are to learn from the past, then Evo Morales Ayma should not be trusted, because of example of Victor Paz Estenssoro. President Paz, with his National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) Party, was the man who ushered in the 1953 Agrarian Reform, after his political party seized power in a bloody Revolution on April 9-11, 1952. While President Paz was in exile in Argentina, he won the election, and had to fight the junta who had taken over.23

One year after being in power, 1953, Paz implements the Land Reform Decree as a means to pacify the revolting masses, and as a means to consolidate the Revolution. In some areas, the Indians had took the land of their former landlord by force, and, according to Victor Paz Estenssoro, “the land reform decree had a clause which stated that from the very first day of the reform, the peasants became owners of sayanas, the plots of land which they had been cultivating.”...“With this, the agitation in the countryside subsided completely.”24 While Paz tried to make sure the former landowners were given some of their land back, or compensated for their property, Paz explains, “The majority of the owners of those fincas which had been taken over by the peasants did not return to them until the process of redistribution had been completed, because the cases affected [by invasion]…were those in which the peasants had been subjected to tremendous abuses from the landlords. Therefore, the owners themselves were fearful of reprisals from [those]…liberated by the land reform.”25

While Bolivia has a long history of violence, the 1952 Revolution wasn't as bloody as say Mexico's Revolution, which saw 1 million perish, or America's, which saw 25,000 die, or Lenin and Trotsky's October Russian Revolution, which saw 6 die. Bolivia's 1952 Revolution was a Proletarian Revolution, where the workers and the peasants, igniting in the Cochabamba valley, where the campesinos drove landowners off their own estates, and ending, as in Mexico, with the government arming the peasants the better to defend their gains.26 3,000 Bolivians died in the 1952 Revolution. The land reform in the Mexican Revolution, from 1910 to 1917, was used to ignite their Revolution, whereas Bolivia's 1953 land reform was used to pacify, and “consolidate” their Revolution.

It wasn't until President Paz's 2nd and 3rd term when he put his counter Revolution, from above, into action, but there were several foreshadowing clues about Paz's eventual deflection of Bolivia's Revolution, such as the immediate correspondence, and cozy meetings with the United States capitalists in back door rooms in the early aftermath of the Revolution. The United States seems to wander into it's Latin American “backyard” whenever it feels like it, and it was true in 1954 during the Eisenhower Administration. The US wanted to make sure that the Bolivian Revolution wouldn't affect their “national interests”. A Pennsylvania newspaper reports in 1954 that “the Eisenhower administration, a conservative regime, has thrown its full weight behind this liberal, left-of-center regime”.27 The United States had sent an ambassador to Bolivia, and were supportive of President Paz. When Paz was asked what he thought about Communism, Paz responded with “I have found that the best way to combat Communism is to give him some land. A man who owns land doesn't become a Communist.”

President Paz was only allowed to be President for one term, according to the new Constitution, and he stepped down in 1956, only to be reelected President in 1960. This turned out to be a fatal mistake for Bolivia, since President Zuazo had been implementing land reform faster than President Paz had when he was in power. President Paz's second term beginning in 1960 was mired with violence, when he had to pacify the peasants he had armed just 8 years prior. The blood of the very same leftists would stain President Paz's legacy he had captured in the 1952 Revolution. This is the beginning of President's Paz's counter Revolution. In October 1964, 10 miners were killed in Oruro, and Paz blamed the Communists and leftists.28 In 1964, turncoat Paz picked Rene Barrientos Ortuno, a right-wing military general (who gleefully kills Che Guevara in 1967), to be his running mate. With the United States CIA's assistance, Lt. General Rene Barrientos overthrows President Paz, and once again, sends Victor Paz Estenssoro into exile.

An American newspaper reported on May 18, 1965 that the “junta last night decided to dismiss all of the nation's principal union leaders and call union elections within 40 days to choose replacements.”…“A mob of about 6000 persons protesting the deportation of one-time Vice President Juan Lechin stormed through the city yesterday, stoning and burning government buildings and overturning autos.”... “Lt. Gen. Rene Barrientos, the junta chief, said in a broadcast that the “demagoguery” of Lechin and ousted ex-President Victor Paz Estenssoro was to blame for the disorders and he promised “energetic and rapid measures... to wipe out agitators and prevent chaos.” ... “The ruling military junta, meanwhile, pressed its drive for a military occupation of the government-run tin mines.”… “Gen. Alfredo Ovando, head of the armed forces, said there will be no truce until they freed the 70 hostages detained by the miners in various mines.”29

Fast forward 20 years, and we see Victor Paz Estenssoro reemerge in 1985, where he is once again elected President of Bolivia (the Constitution only barred “consecutive” terms). 1985 gives Victor Paz Estenssoro his final shot to move Bolivia forward. In 1985, in order to combat inflation, President Paz hires Harvard economist Jeffrey Sachs to implement the New Economic Policy (NEP), or what Naomi Klein calls “shock therapy.” Shock Therapy calls for immediate price increases, severe cuts in government spending and privatization of publicly owned assets, all at once.30 Shock Therapy was used in Chile, after the United States murdered their Socialist President in 1973, and then forced Capitalism on them by the decree of the military junta. Kissinger said that the US was going to make Chile's “economy scream”. Victor Paz was planning on making Bolivia's economy scream. The NEP had the country's national currency, the boliviano, devalued, “export/import controls were removed, price controls and government subsidies on consumer goods were removed, while wages and salaries were frozen. To reduce government spending, educational outlays were slashed, the program of colonizing the lowlands was stopped, and efforts at industrial diversification were halted. Practically all social welfare allocations were terminated.”31 The new MNR betrayed Bolivia's 1952 Revolution because the 1985 New Economic Policy “shifted the ideology that government should be directly responsible for the basic sectors of the economy to an ideology of economic liberalism”32 Paz's New Economic Policy “dramatically changed the course of the previous three decades of nationalism, state intervention, and social rights.”33 Paz “did not emancipate [Bolivia] from foreign domination, lift it from its position as the second poorest in the hemisphere, resolve the question of land tenure, create integrated economic development, or ensure effective democratic rights for the indigenous masses.”34 In 1985, Victor Paz Estenssoro, going from President George to King George III, going from liberator to oppressor, betrayed his own Revolution.

Once the NEP Presidential Decree was issued, miners and labor unions declared a General Strike. Paz doubled the ante and issued a State of Siege, using the military to crack down on the peasants opposed to the Neoliberalism shock therapy, many of whom Paz had armed after the 1952 Revolution. However, Naomi Klein points out, Paz's response “made Thatcher's treatment of the miners seem tame”.35 Paz declared a State of Siege (Martial Law), and rounded up the top 200 union leaders, loaded them onto planes and flew them to remote jails in the rainforests.

The 1985 New Economic Policy counter Revolution was a major victory for the United States, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Instead of having to use brute force, and sustaining free markets for big business's with blood, the United States instead chose to use their large war chest, with loans and aid, in order to keep Paz pacified, and on a short leash36. The United States forced Bolivia to use its scarce capital to compensate former mine owners and repay their foreign debts, instead of domestic development and infrastructure.37 “By January, the British embassy could report to the Foreign Office that Paz Estenssoro was “getting a lot of help and advice from the Americans and knew when to bend his knee” (British Foreign Office Archives #AX1051/1)”38. The United States have their national interests, and Bolivia has theirs. When the two nations have policies that contradict each other (such as America's exported War on Drugs), Bolivia's self-interests should take precedent, and where each nation's self-interests intersect, that creates room for common ground, and cooperation, for trade, security, etc., between the two nations.

The United States used it's Pacification of Bolivia as a model for future countries. The National Security Council saw the successful handling of the Bolivian situation as a model (OCB Central File 091.4 Latin America [File #3] [3], February 3, 1955, 8), and it was one that would be exploited to the fullest in Latin America and elsewhere.” The US influenced Paz with “large-scale financial support”, and “its influence over the Bolivian government was greater than it had been prior to the revolution, since the old ruling class—tied to the tin barons—had been in conflict with the United States over the price of tin (Whitehead, 1969)”. 39
The IMF was so impressed with Bolivia's results, they were “held up as a model for Less Developed Countries around the World”.40 Unfortunately the praise from the IMF couldn't make up for the 1985 NEP Shock Therapy's failure.

Unemployment took its heaviest toll on Bolivia's fragile industrial sector. Without state backing, factory closures led to 35,000 people losing their jobs. Those that remained in employment did not fare much better, with real wages dropping by 40 per cent. Not only did neoliberalism fail to create jobs, but the dismantling of the central bureaucracy undermined the government's ability to respond to the damaging effects of joblessness. Many who lost jobs migrated to the east of the country to grow coca, which by the 1980s was Bolivia's most profitable export.41

The US pushed for the embrace of neoliberal policies, and when those policies didn't take hold, social unrest began to foment in Bolivia. In 2000, we see the Water Wars, and in 2003, the Gas Wars, and then the eventually Electoral “Refounding” Revolution of Evo Morales in 2005. Because of the constant meddling the US has shown towards Bolivia, tension has existed between the two nations. In September 2008, Evo Morales Ayma barred the US Ambassador from Boliva, and the US reciprocated the move. Now Evo Morales Ayma, taking a lesson from his fallen Revolutionary predecessor, is not backing down. He has been calling for a removal of the Embassy from Bolivian soil if they don't stop spreading unrest. Evo Morales also said this: “The Americans used the drug trade to infiltrate our countries. They brought cocaine to Bolivia, as here we only used to chew the coca from the times of the Incas. We believe in a democratic revolution, an indigenous revolution, to claim back our land and all of our natural resources.”42

In 1934, Trotsky, who is popular in Bolivia, wrote that the power of the United States was used to “disunite, weaken and enslave Latin America”. Trotsky believed that the proletariat leader who would free the oppressed all around the world was going to come out of Latin America.43 Fundamental to Marx's idea of revolution was that meaningful change can come only from the masses from below. Freedom will come to the oppressed Bolivians when they grab freedom for themselves, like the indigenous campesino ancestors did in the 1950s, and by learning how to institutionalizing self-government.

The 1952 Revolution started out by being a genuine Proletarian Revolution, where the workers and miners took La Paz, the Capital of Bolivia, over. Eventually the Revolution was co-opted, and then later extinguished by the ruling bourgeois political party. For a Proletarian Revolution to be effective, power must stay in the hands of the lower classes: the workers and the peasants. The US was able to co-opt Bolivia's Revolution, and completely turn it around, by greasing the politician's palms with greenbacks.44 Evo Morales was responsive to the Bolivian People when he decided to pull the plug on the proposed road going through the TIPNIS territory (Isiboro Secure National Park and Indigenous Territory). That's a hopeful sign that Evo Morales will not go the way of Victor Paz. Evo Morales has also been taking strong stands against the US government, kicking out the US ambassador in 2008, and recently, March 2012, he's now threatening to kick out the entire embassy. This is exactly what Evo Morales needs to do. Morales has a great trading partner with China, and so his economy will be okay. Evo Morales Ayma is correct in making the United States earn their trust because of the historical relationship the US had with Bolivia specifically, and with Latin America in general, as has been heavily documented in Eduardo Galeano's 1971 Open Veins in Latin America., the book that Hugo Chavez handed to Barack Obama a few years ago.

The lessons of 1952 Bolivia by the dual-power sharing deal that was agreed on when the April Revolution was over, between Paz's MNR, and Lechin's trade union, the COB (Bolivian Worker's Central) have much to teach. Eventually, the MNR was able to pacify the COB with political appointments45, and took the reins of the power of the Revolution into their own hands, and away from the miners, and led Bolivia straight into a tar pit of financial ruin. The Revolution would have been better preserved had the COB been able to maintain their influence in government affairs with institutions, or they could have crowned themselves, and that would have maintained the integrity of the “people's revolution”, a genuine, of, by, and for the people-type of revolution.

While there is a historical parallel between Bolivia of the 1950s, and Bolivia of the 2000s and 2010s, it's also important to understand that every historical setting is different, and so history is limited to what it can teach. This is especially true in Evo Morales Ayma's case, where there's only a few elected Socialist Heads of State in the World, and so therefore Morales doesn't have much historical guidance for what is to come in Bolivia's future. Revolution and Land Reform are also complicated subjects. A good place to start one's research of the issues of the 1953 Agrarian Reform is a list of 13 problems located at the end of Rodolfo Stavenhagen's Agrarian Problems and Peasant Movements in Latin America (1970), pages 344-346, which goes into greater detail into the issues that Evo Morales may encounter. One creative suggestion that's offered is to have a 2 man mobile team, made up of a land judge and a topographer, who goes around Bolivia, resolving land disputes between conflicting parties.

Thomas Hobbes teaches us that in the State of Nature that life for humans are “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short”. All humans are corruptible, and so if there's no accountability, such as elections, or oversight, such as the COB, and other popular citizen groups, who pressure the government to hear the people's demands, then expect that leader to become corrupt. Don't worship any humans. Victor Paz co-opted Bolivia's Proletarian Revolution. All people are fallible, including the great Evo Morales Ayma. Latin Americans need to be more critical of their iron-fisted dictators, since they seem to like their “caudillos”, such as Hugo Chavez, Juan Peron, others, and fall for their cult of personalities. The allure of the abuse of power is where corruption comes from, and one has to have a strong moral core, a code, a set of principles from which to live by before going into politics. Having a personal code beforehand won't guarantee that the corruptible person will be an untouchable, but without one, there's absolutely no hope for that individual, and therefore, for the common people.

No matter who Morales has advising him, ultimately, history will judge Morales the individual on how well his Administration laid the foundational infrastructure of his Socialist government for generations to come. The three big issues that Evo Morales needs to understand, if he wants his Land Reform to be successful, and for it to last, is: 1) to be mindful of Bolivia's violent history, such as internal coup detats; 2) be skeptical of US interference, such as external coup detats, and; 3) continue to maintain his revolutionary purity by being a fiercely loyal and responsive servant of the Bolivian masses.
Agence France-Presse. 2011. “Bolivia road protests may resume, more officials resign”. Assessed April 18, 2012.

Barnes, Helen. 2005. “Conflict, Inequality and Dialogue for Conflict Resolution in Latin America: The Cases of Argentina, Bolivia and Venezuela”. Human Development Report 2005. Assessed April 18, 2012.

Buechler, Hans C., Eramus, Charles J., and Dwight B. Heath. 1969. Land Reform and Social Revolution in Bolivia. New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers.

Caceres, Eduardo. 2008. “Territories and citizenship: the revolution of the Chiquitanos”. Assessed April 18, 2012.

Carter, William E. 1965. Aymara Communities and the Bolivian Agrarian Reform. Jacksonville: University of Florida Press.

Economy Watch. 2010. “Agrarian Reform in Bolivia”. Accessed April 18, 2012.

Freedom House. 2012. Assessed April 18, 2012.

Gross, Joshua. 2010. “A Covenant with Uncertainty: Considering Contemporary Constitutional Land Reform in Bolivia”. Journal of International Policy Solutions. Volume 12. Assessed April 18, 2012.

Grove, Samuel and Pablo Navarrete. 2008. “A Revolution Without Borders: Reappraising Bolivia's Crisis”. Upside Down World. Assessed April 18, 2012.
Justo, Liborio. 1971. “Bolivia: The Revolution Defeated”. Encyclopedia of Trotskyism OnLine: Revolutionary History. Volume 4, Number 3. Accessed April 18, 2012.

King, Russell. 1977. Land Reform: A World Survey. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.

Klein, Naomi. 2008. The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism. New York: Metropolitan Books. Accessed April 18, 2012.

Looft, Christopher. 2012. “Following Protests, Bolivia Deploys 2,300 Soldiers to Patrol Streets.” Insight: Organized Crime in America. Assessed March 20, 2012.

Patch, Richard W. 1962. Bolivia: 10 Years After the Revolution. Paris: Cuadernos Press.

Pearson, Drew. 1954. “World Watching Bolivia's Land Reform”. Beaver Valley Times. Assessed April 18, 2012.,3650167&dq=bolivia+land+reform&hl=en.
Pittsburgh Post Gazette. 1964. “Bolivia Clash Kills Ten.” Accessed April 18, 2012.,4200378&dq=bolivia&hl=en

Prevost, Gary and Harry E. Vanden. 2012. Politics of Latin America. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stavenhagen, Rodolfo 2007. Agrarian Problems And Peasant Movements in Latin America. New York: Anchor Books.
Sander, John S. 2009. Bolivia's Radical Tradition. Tuscon: University of Arizona Press.
Vazquez, Rodrigo. 2009. “Filmmaker's View: Evo's Battle”. Assessed April 18, 2012.

Wilkie, James W. 1974. Measuring land reform: supplement to the Statistical abstract of Latin America. Oakland: University of California Press.

Zunes, Stephen. 2001. “The United States and Bolivia: The Taming of a Revolution, 1952-1957”. Latin American Perspectives. Vol. 28, No. 5. Accessed April 18, 2012.

1Grove and Naverrete, 2008, 1
2Pearson, 1954, 4
3Freedom House, 2011
4Caceres, 2008, 4
5Looft, 2012
6Wilkie, 1974, 27
7Wilkie, 1974, 34
8Justo, 1971
9Carter, 1965, 11
10Barnes, 2005, 11
11Agence France-Presse, 2011
12Looft, 2012
13Stavenhagen, 1970, 306
14Stagenhagen, 1970, 306
15Wilkie, 1974, 40
16Stagenhagen, 1970, 314
17Stagenhagen, 1970, 311
18Gross, 2010, 3
19Prevost and Vanden, 2012, 568
20Prevost and Vanden, 2012, 567
21Economy Watch, 2010
22Economy Watch, 2010
23Buechler, 1969, 26
24Wilkie, 1974, 28
25Wilkie, 1974, 28
26King, 1977, 115
27Pearson, 1954, 4
28Pittsburgh Post Gazette, 1964
29Miami News, 1965
30Klein, 2008
31Zunes, 2001, 44
32Stavenhagen, 1970, 309
33Caceres, 2008, 2
34Sander, 2009, 117
35Grove and Naverrete, 2008
36Grover and Naverrete, 2008
37Zunes, 2001, 33-49
38Zunes, 2001, 40
39Zunes, 2001, 48
40Grover and Naverette, 2008
41Grover and Naverette, 2008
42Vazquez, 2009
43Sander, 2009, 244
44Patch, 1962, 7
45Justo, 1971

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